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Abstract. For many people, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is so total 
that it is far from clear to them that God (roughly speaking, the God of Jewish 
and Christian tradition) exists at all. Reasonably enough, they therefore do not 
believe that God exists. Yet it is possible, whilst lacking belief in God’s reality, 
nonetheless to see it as a possibility that is both realistic and attractive; and in 
this situation, one will likely want to be open to the considerable benefits that 
would be available if God were real. In this paper I  argue that certain kinds 
of desire for God can aid this non-believing openness. It is possible to desire 
God even in a state of non-belief, since desire does not require belief that its 
object exists. I argue that if we desire God in some particular capacity, and with 
some sense of what would constitute satisfaction, then through the desire we 
have knowledge – incomplete yet vivid in its personal significance – about the 
attributes God would need in order to satisfy us; thus, if God is real and does 
have those attributes, one knows something about God through desiring him. 
Because desire does not require belief, neither does the knowledge in question. 
Expanding on recent work by Vadas and Wynn, I sketch the epistemology of 
desire needed to support this argument. I then apply this epistemology to desire 
for God. An important question is how one might cultivate the requisite kinds 
desire for God; and one way, I argue, is through engaging with certain kinds 
of sacred music. I illustrate desire’s religiously epistemic power in this context, 
before replying to two objections.
I. TYPES OF DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND FRAMING THE ARGUMENT
Two problems have been called ‘the problem of divine hiddenness’. One 
is the widespread non-belief in God’s existence among those who are 
not resistant to relationship with God, which has been used, primarily 
by John Schellenberg, to argue that God as traditionally conceived 
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does not exist. The other ‘problem of divine hiddenness’ is God’s non-
manifestation to believers. The first is an evidential problem for theists 
in general: the fact that there are non-resistant people who don’t believe 
in God’s existence is taken as evidence of his non-existence. The second 
is a spiritual problem for theists who, at least at times, do not seem to 
experience God.
My focus is different again. I  am interested in a  particular kind of 
cognitive and affective situation: a  specific kind of situation within 
the broad kind that concerns Schellenberg. The broad kind is that 
of someone for whom it is far from clear that the God of Jewish and 
Christian tradition exists, and who therefore does not believe he exists. 
Within this, the specific kind of situation that interests me is of someone 
who, whilst uncertain over God’s reality, nonetheless sees God’s existence 
as a live hypothesis (in William James’ sense)1 and even an attractive one. 
Such a person will want to be open to the inestimable benefits that would 
be available if God were real (i.e., be able to receive and live out those 
benefits), and I  shall argue that certain forms of belief-less desire for 
God can play a role in this. If God is real, then one can know about him 
in desiring him. Rightly ordered desire can thereby start to familiarise 
the desirer with God’s nature, direct her towards him, and propel her 
onwards in the spiritual quest.
Thus, we are concerned with the possibility of God’s reality: 
specifically, how one’s desire for God can help one to be open to benefits 
that would be available if he were real. Since Schellenberg’s divine 
hiddenness argument seeks to dispense with the possibility of God’s 
reality, I’ll proceed on the contentious assumption that the argument is 
flawed.2 But even if non-resistant non-belief turns out not to be evidence 
1 A  live hypothesis is one which appeals as a  real possibility to him to whom it is 
proposed’; it makes an ‘electric connection with [one’s] nature’ and ‘scintillate[s] with ... 
credibility’. William James, ‘The Will to Believe’, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy (New York, NY: Longmans Green and Co, 1897), p. 2.
2 The general shape of Schellenberg’s argument, and of my case against it, are as 
follows. Schellenberg argues that if God – characterised as unsurpassably loving – existed, 
then anyone who tried to have a personal relationship with him would at that time be 
able to do so, and would therefore at that time believe he exists. But some people try to 
have a  personal relationship with God, yet do not believe God exists; therefore, God 
does not exist. See J. L. Schellenberg, ‘Divine Hiddenness and Human Philosophy’, in 
Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, ed. by Adam Green and Eleonore 
Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 13–32 (the version consulted 
here is an online manuscript, accessed 4th April 2016, http://www.jlschellenberg.com/
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against God’s existence, many are still left with insufficient reason to 
believe. If ‘doxastic divine hiddenness’ is not an evidential problem for 
theists, it is still a spiritual problem for those interested in religious belief 
but unable to believe, since on the face of it, it is hard to see how one who 
does not believe in God’s existence might remain open to the benefits 
that would be available if he were real.
As a way out of this problem, I submit that it is indeed possible to 
cultivate some amount of openness to God without believing he exists. 
One can desire God without belief in this sense, since in general it is 
possible to desire something without believing it exists. In what follows 
I’ll argue that under certain conditions, one can know in desiring God 
something of what he would be like in satisfying the desire; thus, if God 
is real and would satisfy the desire, one knows something about God 
in this capacity, where this knowledge is available even in the absence 
of satisfaction and is therefore imbued with a certain kind of existential 
significance. (Note that I  do not say the desire is evidence for God’s 
reality; rather, it is a way of knowing about God if he is real.) The desire 
thus helps establish an  epistemic and affective framework for seeking 
God. My claim therefore forms part of a wider suggestion to those in 
the situation I  have described: engage non-doxastically in religious 
practice – not, as Pascal urged in the context of his ‘wager’, to acquire 
beliefs that one already wants to hold,3 but rather to give one’s awareness 
the chance to shift in ways perhaps unforeseeable.
When I come to discuss desire-based knowledge about God, I will do 
so in the particular context of sacred music. Sacred music has the power 
uploads/8/5/6/1/8561683/divine_hiddenness_and_human_philosophy.pdf). I  contend 
that the existence of an unsurpassably loving God is compatible with non-belief among 
those who try for a  relationship with him. We’d expect God to seek relationship with 
everyone – thus enabling belief in every non-resistant person – in this life, since we think 
we would in his situation. But unsurpassable love only requires God to seek relationship 
ultimately with everyone, even if only after death, thus ultimately enabling belief in every 
non-resistant person – which for all we know may be the case. There may be reasons 
incomprehensible to us as to why, for some non-resistant people, God is open to full 
relationship only in the afterlife. He might therefore prevent such people from believing 
in his existence during their earthly lives. If we cannot comprehend why God wouldn’t 
be open to full relationship with some people in this life, then non-resistant non-belief 
and non-relationship are surprising given his existence. But things that are surprising 
given God’s existence are compatible with his existence, since we cannot expect to know 
everything about his workings.
3 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. by A. J. Krailsheimer, revised edition (London: Penguin, 
1995), pp. 124–5, no. 418.
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to move us profoundly – something often true even of non-believers.4 
One way it can do this for non-believers is by eliciting desire for God, 
since desire does not require belief that its object exists. There are many 
sacred works whose music and text can elicit desire for God, and I’ll 
discuss one especially powerful example: Henry Purcell’s anthem Hear 
My Prayer, O Lord. I’ll argue that by eliciting a desire for God that satisfies 
certain conditions, sacred music can engender the kind of desire-based 
knowledge about God that I’ve mentioned, which does not require belief 
in God’s reality.
II. DESIRE AS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE DESIRED
To show that religious desire can play the role I  have outlined, I’ll 
first discuss some non-religious desires, highlighting how they enable 
knowledge about their objects. Non-religious examples will clarify the 
epistemically important features of desire, since these features are more 
clear-cut in such cases than in religious contexts. Once we’re clear on the 
phenomenology and conditions of desire-based knowledge as I present 
it, we’ll turn to their religious application.
We can start with an observation made by Melinda Vadas: desire is both 
a present affect and a projection of affect, which are phenomenologically 
inseparable. In desiring something, I  predict I  will feel a  certain way 
if satisfied.5 Mark Wynn develops this insight in relation to the desire 
for musical resolution, pointing out that here the desire itself gives the 
desirer knowledge about its object by casting the mind forwards:
on account of its felt recognition of the tension, the mind is cast forward, 
in desire, to an  anticipated moment of ‘resolution’ ... the character of 
this resolution is grasped not musicologically, or in purely auditory 
terms (after all, it is not available to be heard as yet), but by way of 
the felt yearning or longing which points ... towards what is required if 
a resolution of this particular musical tension is to be achieved.6
4 As David Pugmire observes, ‘Sacred music seems to have a surprising power over 
unbelievers ... to ply them ... with what might be called devotional feelings.’ See David 
Pugmire, ‘The Secular Reception of Religious Music’, Philosophy 81, no. 1 (2006), 65.
5 Melinda Vadas, ‘Affective and Non-Affective Desire’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 45, no. 2 (1984), 276–7.
6 Mark Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating 
Perception, Conception and Feeling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
p. 106 (emphasis added).
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In feeling the desire, one is aware of how a satisfying musical resolution 
would sound. The desire therefore brings with it a kind of knowledge of 
the resolution’s nature before it happens.
Let’s look more closely at this sort of experience. The first thing 
to notice is that the desire for musical resolution is for something in 
a particular capacity – for a chord or note in the capacity of resolving 
musical tension. The knowledge the desire enables in Wynn’s example is 
knowledge of what something would be like in the capacity of providing 
satisfaction. With this established, I’ll now turn to another form of 
desire: desire for food. As certain Biblical passages highlight, this can be 
phenomenologically similar to the desire for God, and it can thus help 
us develop an  epistemology of desire applicable to God.7 My concern 
here is the desire for some particular kind of food rather than general 
hunger; and although Biblical hunger-based analogies for desiring God 
relate more to the general desire for sustenance or nourishment than to 
desires for particular foods, these need not be distinct. This is obvious 
in the case of food (a  desire for a  particular food can be a  desire for 
nourishment), but it is also true of desire for God: desiring God in some 
particular capacity can be seen as desiring some particular aspect of his 
nourishment or sustenance. Thus, Biblically depicted hunger for God can 
be phenomenologically similar to the desire for food I use in developing 
my epistemology.
The desire I have in mind, then, is for some specific food or other. We 
have all found ourselves in the mood for a particular food – a buttery 
cinnamon bagel, a  juicy strawberry, or whatever it might be. Desiring 
food in this way, one senses what would constitute satisfaction – including 
tasting the food’s flavour and feeling its texture and temperature in 
one’s mouth. Through this sense as experienced with the desire, one 
can ‘practically taste’ the food in question, and this enables knowledge 
of the kind Wynn describes: the aspects of the food that one knows 
7 The analogy between hungering for food and desiring God is highlighted at certain 
points in the Bible. In the Old Testament, see for instance Amos 8:11: ‘“Behold, the 
days are coming,” declares the Lord God, “when I will send a famine on the land – not 
a famine of bread ... but of hearing the words of the Lord ... ”’ And in the New Testament, 
John’s Gospel is especially noteworthy for its language of hunger and food regarding 
God. See Jesus’ ‘I am the bread of life’ address in John 6:22–59, which recapitulates and 
extends the theme, from the book of Exodus, of the bread that comes from heaven. 
Biblical translations (except for that used in Purcell’s piece to be discussed later) are from 
the English Standard Version Anglicised.
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about through desiring it are those that would bring about what, one 
senses, satisfaction would involve  – for instance, its flavour, texture, 
and temperature. A vivid example of this can be found in Leo Tolstoy’s 
Anna Karenina. In one scene, the protagonist Levin has returned from 
a hunting trip ‘tired and hungry’, only to find that his companions have 
finished off all the provisions. The passage continues, ‘Levin had been 
dreaming so specifically of pirozhki [stuffed buns] that, as he approached 
their quarters, he could already feel their smell and taste in his mouth’.8 
In the event, Levin does not have the satisfaction of tasting the pirozhki; 
yet his knowledge of their smell and taste is certainly heightened by his 
desire for them. We see, then, that desiring to eat a particular food can 
give the desirer knowledge of what it would be like in the capacity of 
providing satisfaction. Moreover, because of its inherent sense of lack, 
this knowledge involves an  especially clear recognition of the food’s 
importance to oneself as the desirer.
Now clearly one’s sense of what would satisfy the desire is based on 
past experience: one cannot imagine eating a particular food if one has 
no experience along those lines. But one need not have experienced 
anything exactly like the projected satisfaction: to imagine what it 
would be like, it is enough to have had experience somewhat like it. 
I have eaten mango, dark melted chocolate, and solid mint chocolate all 
separately, but I have never eaten mango covered in melted dark, mint 
chocolate. Nonetheless, I desire this combination; if I think of it, I can 
form a sense of how it would taste and feel in my mouth. This sense of 
what would constitute satisfaction is based on my imaginative powers 
and an  amalgamation of memories, and so the example shows that 
desire-based knowledge can be rooted in experience merely analogous 
to whatever would constitute satisfaction. This is important for knowing 
about God through desiring him, since in many cases one will not have 
fully experienced the satisfaction from him for which one yearns.
It is worth supplementing this account with another kind of desire 
that shares phenomenological features with desire for God: romantic 
desire. Like desire for God, this is felt towards a person and would be 
satisfied by something more than sense experience (even if satisfaction 
were to come through sense experience). Romantic desire is another 
kind that can give the desirer knowledge as I have been describing it. 
8 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, trans. by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, 
revised edition (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 596.
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Its affectivity permeates our concepts of the attributes through which 
(we sense) we would be satisfied. For instance, our notion of ‘intimately 
loving and supportive’ acquires a hue of emotional significance in light 
of our desire and our sense of what would constitute satisfaction: we 
know how these attributes matter to us in a  romantic context. And 
our knowledge of what the attributes would be in contributing to our 
satisfaction is thus deepened.
We can now state the conditions for the desire-based knowledge 
I’ve described. First, the desire must be for something in a  particular 
capacity; hence, the knowledge is of what something would be like in the 
capacity of providing satisfaction. Second, one needs some sense of what 
would constitute satisfaction; and the aspects of the desire’s object that 
one knows about through the desire are those that would bring about 
this projected satisfaction. And third, in order to have this sense, one 
must have experienced at least something like the projected satisfaction. 
Note that belief in the existence of what one desires is not needed for 
any of these conditions. The knowledge may take the propositional form, 
‘if x existed, x would be such-and-such in satisfying my desire’, where 
‘such-and-such’ denotes attributes grasped in terms of their importance 
to the desirer.
With these conditions in mind, we can now turn to desire for God.
III. KNOWING ABOUT GOD THROUGH DESIRE: 
A MUSICAL EXAMPLE
Desire for God, like other desires, can come in degrees of specificity; 
and it should now be clear that to enable knowledge about God in the 
way described, a desire must be rather specific. Therefore, to shed light 
on desire’s religiously epistemic power along the lines we’ve explored, 
we must consider specific forms of desire for God; and I’ll now consider 
how one such form of desire can yield a particular content of theistic 
knowledge. What I say will illustrate how desire can work epistemically 
in a  religious context, and the general epistemic components would 
therefore apply to many other specific forms of religious desire.
One kind of experience that can elicit a longing for God is engagement 
with sacred music. I  do not claim that all sacred music does so; such 
music can express and elicit many affective states. But I take it that one 
natural response to sacred music is a  longing for the fullness of that 
transcendence at which it so often seems to hint. This is because of 
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music’s capacity for beauty, and also because of how it can combine with 
text to achieve nuanced and specific expression: through presenting in 
a certain way a text that expresses a specific form of desire for God, music 
can elicit a specific form of desire in the listener. I’ll now briefly consider 
the epistemic capacity of the desire for God in one especially powerful 
sacred anthem: the desperate cry of Purcell’s Hear My Prayer, O Lord.9 
The listener’s response I’ll describe is simply an example of the religious 
desire that sacred music may plausibly elicit, in order to illustrate music’s 
ability to elicit desire for God, and desire’s ability to yield knowledge 
about God.
The text of the piece opens Psalm 102: ‘Hear my prayer, O Lord, and 
let my crying come unto thee’. Purcell’s extraordinary music, in its slow 
build to a  final, anguished climax, combines with the text to express 
a heart-rending longing for God in human distress – i.e., for God in the 
capacity of compassionately hearing and supporting. The piece does not 
elicit this precise yearning in the listener, since it cannot bring about 
the distress that is central to such yearning (one would hope not, at any 
rate). However, it can elicit a corresponding desire. Empathising with the 
psalmist, one recognises one’s own capacity to reach in desperate situations 
for ‘something more’; and, given that this recognition is brought on by 
a piece of Christian sacred music, one will likely think of this ‘something 
more’ as the God portrayed in the piece – the God of Jewish and Christian 
tradition. The listener’s response I have in mind, then, is an analogue of 
desperation: by recognising our capacity for desperation before God, we 
experience something of that desperation without feeling it fully. This is 
possible because neither Purcell’s music nor the psalmist’s text refers to 
any unfortunate circumstance.10 Although the piece expresses distress 
9 There are recordings readily available online, for example at
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8E0dt0soWc (accessed 4th April 2016).
10 For music’s inability to refer to specific kinds of circumstance, see, e.g., Aaron Ridley, 
Music, Value and the Passions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 110–13. 
The wider context of Ridley’s view is an  account of how music can be expressive of 
affective states, known as the ‘resemblance theory’: according to this account, music is 
expressive of affective states by resembling human expressive behaviour – particularly 
voice and movement. See ibid., chap. 4; and see also James O. Young, Critique of Pure 
Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 15–26, for an array of psychological 
evidence in support of the theory. However, regardless of whether or not one endorses 
the resemblance theory, it is hard to see how Purcell’s music, or any other music, can 
refer to any particular kind of circumstance; and, given that the text of the piece clearly 
does not do so either, the piece as a whole cannot refer to any unfortunate circumstance.
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and thus implies some unfortunate circumstance, it is perfectly possible 
to listen to the piece and not have any misfortune called to mind. Thus, 
unlike true desperation, the analogue of desperation before God that 
Purcell’s piece can elicit is not felt about any unpleasant circumstance, 
and is therefore not itself unpleasant.
In this way, without feeling the full force of the psalmist’s desperation, 
one grasps enough of it to form some sense of what would satisfy it – 
based on past experience of that satisfaction or on analogous experience 
(typically from interpersonal relationships, where another human being 
has provided comfort and support in a  time of distress). Satisfaction 
here – an answer to the desperation in Purcell’s piece – would involve 
a  profoundly changed, hopeful perspective, a  sense of widened 
possibilities. The attributes God would need for effecting this include 
deep resourcefulness – enabling him to see hope in an apparently hopeless 
situation – and the power to convey this hope lovingly to the sufferer. 
Or to use Rowan Williams’ words, in order to satisfy the desperation 
in Purcell’s piece, God would need the power to ‘[open] the door to 
a future even when we can see no hope’. It would have to be the case that 
‘there is nowhere God is absent, powerless or irrelevant; no situation in 
the universe in the face of which God is at a loss ... God always has the 
capacity to do something fresh and different, to bring something new 
out of a situation’.11 Through desiring God in the way I have described, 
then, one’s notions of attributes such as ‘deeply resourceful’, ‘loving’, and 
‘supportive’ acquire a hue of emotional significance in light of the desire 
and the sense of what would constitute satisfaction: one knows how 
those attributes matter to oneself in a religious context. And one thereby 
knows with particular existential sharpness something of what God’s 
nature would be in satisfying the yearning, a sharpness heightened by 
the lack of God’s tangible presence at that time. Thus, if God is real and 
has that nature, one knows something about God through desiring him.
IV. TWO OBJECTIONS
Objection 1: Can we sense what divine satisfaction would involve without 
any past experience of it?
I said that in having some sense of what it would be like to be satisfied in the 
11 Rowan Williams, Tokens of Trust: An  Introduction to Christian Belief (London: 
Canterbury Press Norwich, 2007), pp. 44, 16.
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psalmist’s desperate yearning for God, one can refer to past experiences 
of one’s own that were analogous to that satisfaction  – notably from 
interpersonal relationships, where another human provided comfort 
and support in a time of distress. But it might be objected: can we really 
have, on the basis of our worldly experience, any sense of what would 
constitute divine satisfaction, and thus knowledge of what God would be 
like in granting it? Indeed, this objection might be applied not just to the 
desiring response to Purcell’s piece described above, but to desire for God 
in general. In support of this attack, one might refer to what have become 
known as ‘transformative experiences’, roughly characterisable for our 
purposes as experiences that effect changes in the subject – changes that, 
in at least some cases, could not have happened in any other way. In 
a recent paper, L. A. Paul has argued that one such kind of experience 
is that of having a child; more specifically, this is both epistemically and 
personally transformative.12 That is, the experience of having a  child 
gives a person knowledge of what it is like to have a child, knowledge 
unavailable to one who remains childless; moreover, it radically changes 
what it is like to be the person in question.13 Importantly, there are no 
other experiences that, were one to have them, would allow one to 
project forward with any accuracy to a  sense of what it would be like 
to have a child of one’s own. Any analogous experience one might have 
(such as looking after other children) is simply not similar enough.14
But (the objector might continue), isn’t an experience of God similar 
in this way to that of having a child? The philosopher Thomas Morris 
no doubt speaks for many believers when he writes that ‘the Christian 
faith ... has on occasion turned my little world upside down.’15 Surely it is 
impossible, before experiencing God in such a radically transformative 
way, to know anything of what it will be like? After all, such an experience 
is a  complete re-ordering of one’s priorities, and of where one’s worth 
as a person seems to originate (the experience will likely be diachronic, 
developing over time). It is, so to speak, the inhabiting of a  different 
paradigm, which gives other experiences a  significance they would 
12 L. A. Paul, ‘What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting’, Res Philosophica 92, 
no. 2 (2015), see esp. pp. 153–62.
13 Ibid., pp. 156–7.
14 Ibid., p. 161.
15 Thomas V. Morris, ‘Suspicions of Something More’, in God and the Philosophers: 
The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason, ed. by Thomas V. Morris (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp. 8–9.
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not otherwise have had. How, then, could anything prior to such 
an  experience of God give a  clue as to what it would be like? And to 
round off the objection, we can situate any experience that seems to come 
from God  – including satisfaction of the desire expressed in Purcell’s 
piece  – within this understanding of what it is to experience God. If, 
so our objector will claim, the profoundly changed, hopeful perspective 
that would satisfy the psalmist’s yearning seems to come from God, then 
it will get whatever significance it has from a wider conception of God’s 
priorities and of how they relate to one’s own life. But if one has not already 
experienced (or seemingly experienced) these things, then one cannot 
begin to conceive of them – and this makes it impossible to conceive of 
what it would be to have a changed perspective that seems to come from 
God, and which satisfies the kind of desperation expressed in Purcell’s 
piece. If one has not had a transformative theistic experience, then one 
cannot form any remotely accurate sense of what the satisfaction of the 
psalmist’s desire would be like.16
To this objection, we can reply as follows. According to a prominent 
characterisation in the Christian tradition of how experiences of God 
relate to other experiences, there are experiences that can help one to 
form a somewhat accurate sense of what it would be like to experience 
God in various ways. This way of thinking has its roots in the Bible, for 
example in the first Johannine epistle’s affirmation that ‘love is from 
God, and whoever loves has been born of God and knows God.’17 And 
we find similar ideas elsewhere  – Aquinas, for instance, stating that 
‘we know [God] accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of 
creatures’.18 In short, the idea is that from our engagement with others, 
we can know to some extent what it would be like to relate to God. 
Moreover, L. A. Paul’s example shows that this includes knowledge of 
what it is like to be personally transformed, in ways that are analogous 
to the transformations in the life of a  believer  – such as having one’s 
priorities re-ordered and having another person at the centre of one’s 
life. Having a child is one example, but there are of course others, such 
as getting married.
16 I thank Joshua Cockayne and Amber Griffioen for raising this objection.
17 1 John 4:7.
18 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, online (Kevin Knight, 2008), I, Q13, A2, ad 3, accessed 5th April 2016, http://
www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html.
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When one engages with the ‘live hypothesis’ of God’s existence within 
this mode of thinking, the following line of reasoning becomes apposite. 
If (a) we can know something of what relationship with God is like 
through our relationships with other people, and if (b) we desire God in 
a capacity somewhat similar to the ways in which we have experienced 
interpersonal relationships, then we can know, based on our experience 
of the world and an  imaginative leap, something of what God would 
be like in satisfying our desires for him. To take the Purcell case: we 
know that in satisfying our desire for a compassionate presence, humans 
are loving, supportive, and resourceful, opening up possibilities for 
hope where we saw none; and we are also familiar with the relational 
context of the person’s concern for us, which gives this changed, hopeful 
perspective its significance. If we combine our experience of human 
love, support, and resourcefulness with the idea of God as infinitely 
resourceful (we might see this as an aspect of his omnipotence), then 
we can form some sense of what it would be like to be on the receiving 
end of God’s resourcefulness – for instance, by imagining having hope 
opened up for us where no human being could have done so. And to 
imagine this is just to imagine what it would be like to experience this 
infinite resourcefulness – i.e., to imagine something of what this infinite 
resourcefulness is like. If one does this in the midst of a desire for God 
that is centred on such resourcefulness, then one’s (partial) knowledge of 
what it would be like to experience it will be shot through with personal, 
emotional significance in the way already described. It is worth stressing 
once more that none of this presupposes any belief in the reality of 
such divine resourcefulness. The desire-based knowledge may take the 
propositional form, ‘if God existed, God would be infinitely resourceful 
in satisfying my desire’, where ‘infinitely resourceful’ denotes a  divine 
attribute grasped in terms of its special importance to the desirer.
Objection 2: Isn’t this all just wishful thinking?
Even if it is possible, without past experience of divine satisfaction, 
to have a  sense of what that satisfaction would be like, there remains 
another danger. For couldn’t this all be just so much wishful thinking? 
If one has a  desire that is directed at God as one conceives of him, 
along with a sense of what would constitute satisfaction and resultant, 
‘existentially sharp’ knowledge of what God would be like in granting 
that satisfaction, couldn’t this simply be a matter of knowing how one 
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would like God to be in satisfying one’s desire, with no correspondence 
to God’s actual nature if he is real?19
In order for a desire to enable the kind of knowledge described here 
about a God who were real, that desire’s satisfaction would need to be 
something that such a God would bring about: in other words, the desire 
would need to be rightly ordered towards God. It is true, of course, that 
desire can go wayward, and this is perhaps especially so of desire for 
God: here there is an ever-present risk of ‘[using] God to fill the gaps in 
our needs and preferences’20 – a risk of forming ideas about God based 
on what we think he ought to do for us (one might, for instance, desire 
success, and take God to be one who would grant such a desire).
Part of the point in discussing Christian sacred music was to show 
one way of ordering one’s desires towards things that God, as conceived 
in the Christian tradition (including its roots in the Hebrew Bible), 
could be hoped to grant if he were real. As we have seen, because of 
its capacity to shape a  desire with both a  specific affective colour and 
the conceptual content of the text, music is well placed to do this. And 
in general, one can engage in the Church’s music and liturgy, as well as 
in other practices such as regular meditation or prayer; and this can all 
happen alongside continued theological reflection on God’s nature in 
light of certain core, definitional divine attributes and the experiences 
of the tradition’s ‘cloud of witnesses’. If one does this with a degree of 
fruitfulness, then there is some hope that one will come to have desires 
whose satisfaction really would be granted by the God to whom all this 
engagement points; and these desires would thereby be focused on God 
as he has been characterised within the tradition in its more spiritually 
mature forms. The knowledge resulting from such desires would then be 
about this sort of God – and it is this sort of knowledge, I take it, that one 
would be pursuing in the situation I outlined at the start of the paper, in 
which the existence of such a God is a live hypothesis.
V. CONCLUSION: DIVINE HIDDENNESS 
AND FRAMEWORKS FOR SEEKING
I started by describing the sort of situation that concerns me in which 
God seems hidden: that of not being persuaded of the truth of a given 
19 My thanks go to Sameer Yadav for raising this objection.
20 Williams, Tokens of Trust, p. 157.
64 JULIAN PERLMUTTER
theistic worldview because one does not see enough evidence for it, but 
of nonetheless being interested in that worldview and wanting to remain 
open to the potential benefits that would flow from its truth. I also said 
that if God is real, then desire-based knowledge about him can further 
this openness by establishing an  epistemic and affective framework for 
seeking him. How does this claim relate to the foregoing exploration 
of religious desire? Through the desiring response to Purcell’s piece 
that I  described, one knows something of what God would be like if 
he were to satisfy the desire (the epistemic framework). The existential 
significance that permeates this knowledge and enriches one’s concepts 
of the relevant divine attributes will draw one into seeking God more 
than a  thinner understanding of those attributes would. The spiritual 
quest has personal import (the affective framework). The desperate 
yearning of Purcell’s piece is one of many different kinds of longing for 
God; and we can note the power of sacred music to elicit a huge variety 
of them. Other forms of desire will enable knowledge about different 
divine attributes depending on what would constitute satisfaction, and 
will frame one’s religious engagement accordingly. It should be clear, 
then, that desire for God in its various forms has a tremendous capacity 
to ignite, shape, and sustain a  journey of religious openness. Because 
one can desire God without believing in his existence, this journey, and 
the desire-based knowledge that fuels it, are available even to those from 
whom God seems too hidden for belief to be a possibility.21
21 This paper was written with the support of an  Arts and Humanities Research 
Council Doctoral Studentship.
